We Are Not A Hive Mind

Many non-plural people, particularly those who have been exposed to the dissociation model of plurality, often have difficulty treating members of plural collectives as individuals. Some cite inability to grasp the comparative complexity of plurality; and others believe it inappropriate to encourage "alters'" individuality, on the grounds that multiplicity is a dysfunctional, inherently pathological state; and they cannot in good conscience encourage it. Whilst I can apprehend their reasoning for adopting such views on plural individuation -- cultural conditioning against overt manifestations of plurality is prevalent in Western society -- I cannot support it, for they deny that such complexity can exist in the human brain, and there is no valid scientific basis for declaring a subjective, often beneficial neurological difference pathological in and of itself.

Telling members of plural groups that they cannot be individuated is a tacit implication that their neurological configuration is unacceptable and should not be encouraged. There have been no scientific studies -- that I have heard of, anyway -- proving conclusively that each brain must have exactly one conscious entity present, as many of my colleagues in the Fen Group have said in previous articles.

Forcing plurals to adhere to a strict definition of consciousness is ignorant at best and disingenuous at worst. It implies that singular is always better than plural, regardless of how co-operative a collective may be, or how ill-bred a non-plural person may be. We are judged simply because of our plurality.

If the argument is one of "simple versus complex," why is a simple, "commoner" identity superior to a more complex one? Is not it better to be complex sometimes? An aversion to thinking strongly about consciousness should not be an excuse to perpetuate discrimination against those whose internal structures seem more "complex" than the average.

Cannot we retain others' good favour and remain forthright about our constitutional separation? We suffer no affliction apart from society's ill will. I do not pretend that plurality will be accepted as a normal variation within our lifetime, but I do hope that it will. It cannot be beyond all singlets' faculties to apprehend plurality.

Apart from the unjust favouring of one mental configuration over another, treating plural systems as single persons (or hive minds) deprives them of their right to self-definition and -expression. By what right have I my own constitution if the rest of the Fenners and I are the "same person"? How can I adequately make clear my opinions if I cannot be Imogen, but a nameless fragment of an imagined singular conscious entity? I am rendered nameless, faceless and soulless, even though I am as existent as any separate-bodied person. I know I can distinguish my own soul from others', but that is utterly irrelevant to those who seek to erase our differences. I am rendered invisible, and cannot make myself visible.

Unfortunately, this behaviour is not limited to non-plurals; we have observed other plurals doing it. My objections against such treatment still stand, but it is especially appalling from plural groups, who should be acutely sensitive to the pertinent issues of individuation. I think that for these people, it is an issue of being accustomed to singlets' language, as well as the lack of "cultural permission" for plurality.

Related articles:
Links within Ex Uno Plures
Dissociation and Assumptions, by Richard
Plural Individuation, by Richard and Kerry
Plural Etiquette, by Kerry
Polyphobia, by Hess